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WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
loss properly proven and shown for income tax purposes by a
recognized approved method of accounting."8 Thus it appears that
if the transaction which gives rise to the deduction is bonafide,
legal, and arises in the year when it is deducted or is properly
reflected in the taxpayer's method of accounting, it will be deduc-
tible for income tax purposes in the year and will not materially
distort the taxpayer's income. Applying these principles to the
loan transactions, the first criteria which the taxpayer must meet
in order not to lose his prepaid interest deduction on the basis
that it materially distorts his income is to prove that the obligation
to pay the interest and principle is legally enforcible, bonafide, and
not a sham. If the taxpayer gets over this hurdle, he must then
show that he has reasons for obtaining the loan other than lowering
his taxes by the interest deduction. If he is unsuccessful in proving
this, the holding in the Goldstein9 case may preclude his deduction.
If the tax payer is able to prove the proper nature of his transaction
and that it complies with the factors set forth in Revenue Ruling
68-643, he may then deduct up to two years prepaid interest.
William A. Kolibush
POLITICAL DEFAMATION: THE PRICE OF CANDIDACY
During an election campaign, basic rights clash. First, candidates
have limited rights proscribing the publication of defamatory false-
hoods. But the candidates' rights conflict with freedom of speech,
freedom of the press, and the public's right to a full disclosure of
the record, character, and abilities of the candidates from whom
the public will select its leaders. The delicate balancing of these
interests has led to an ever-evolving body of law on the defamation
of political candidates.
An ordinary private citizen whose rights have been injured by
a defamatory communication usually may recover because there
18 Under taxpayer's approved accrual method of reporting net income
or operating loss for income taxes it is a bona fide, legal liability, and
resulting loss is an actual loss. We find nothing in the wording of the
statute that exempts from its operation legal losses properly proven and
shown for income tax purposes by a recognized method of accounting.
Although Section 122 is limited in its application in a number of ways
by its express provisions, the limitation contended for by the Commission-
er is not included. Id at 646.
37 364 F.2d 734 (2nd Cir 1966).
[Vol. 71
1
McCauley: Political Defamation: The Price of Candidacy
Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1969
STUDENT NOTES
will ordinarily be no issue of privilege presented. When a private
citizen asserts a claim of defamation, truth will generally be the
only complete defense for the publisher. In contrast the law is
much more lenient toward the publisher when the plaintiff in a
defamation action is one whose position affects the public interest.
In such cases the law of privilege has arisen in order to protect the
right of the public to freely discuss the qualifications and activities
of a public figure. It is generally recognized that publications
respecting public affairs, public officers, and candidates for public
office are to some degree privileged.' In this context, a privileged
communication is one which would normally be considered libelous,
but is permitted because it has been made in the public interest.2
Truth will always be a valid and complete defense for a publisher
accused of defamation.' If the defendant publisher can prove
the truth of the matters asserted in his publication, he has an ab-
solute defense even if the plaintiff has already shown malice on
the part of the publisher.'
I Brown v. Houston Printing Co., 255 S.W. 254 (Tex. Civ. App. 1923);
See, Annot., 55 A.L.R. 854, 860 (1928).
2 Parker v. Appalachian Elec. Power Co., 126 W. Va. 666, 672, 30
S.E.2d 1, 4 (1944); 12 MIcEuE's JuR., Libel and Slander, § 18 (1950); 33
Am. JuR., Libel and Slander, § 87 (1941).
There are two classifications of privilege-absolute privilege and qualified
privilege. See, W. PROSSER, TORTS, § 109 at 795 and § 110 at 805 (3d ed.
1964). When a publication is deemed to be absolutely privileged-such as a
statement made in legislative, judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings, "judgment
is rendered for the defendant as a matter of law." Swearingen v. Parkersburg
Sentinel Co., 125 W. Va. 731, 743, 26 S.E.2d 209, 215 (1943); accord, Ward
v. Ward, 47 W. Va. 766, 770, 35 S.E. 873, 875 (1900).
West Virginia has differentiated absolute privilege and qualified privilege,
by declaring that "in cases of absolutely privileged communications, the
occasion is an absolute bar to the action; whereas, in cases of conditionally
or qualifiedly privileged communications, the law raises only a prima facie
presumption in favor of the occasion . . ." City of Mullens v. Davidson, 133
W. Va. 557, 563, 57 S.E.2d 1, 6 (1949), quoting 53 C.1.S., Libel & Slander,
§ 87 (1948).3 E.g., Sweeney v. Baker, 13 W. Va. 158 (1878).4 England v. Daily Gazette Co., 143 W. Va. 700, 104 S.E. 2d 306
(1958); Barger v. Hood, 87 W. Va. 78, 104 S.E. 280 (1920); Siever v.
Coffman, 80 W. Va. 420, 92 S.E. 669 (1917).
There seems to have been confusion as to whether or not there has to
be proof of good faith and justifiable ends in addition to proof of truth
in West Virginia. The West Virginia constitution provides, "In prosecutions
and civil suits for libel, the truth may be given in evidence; and if it shall
appear to the jury, that the matter charged as libelous, is true, and was pub-
lished with good motives, and for justifiable ends, the verdict shall be for the
defendant." W. VA. CoNsT., art. III, § 8. Thus, it appears that in a libel
suit, once the defendant proved the truth of a matter exceeding the privilege,
he would also be called upon to prove good motive and justifiable end,
A West Virginia case held that the wording of this section confined it to ac-
19691
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Prior to the 1964 decision of New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,'
the scales balancing the rights of the candidate and the rights of
the public to information about the candidate leaned in the direction
of the candidate in the majority of states, at least insofar as false
publications were concerned. The leading case of Post Publishing
Co. v. Hallam6 enunciated the predominant view that a defamed
individual who was in public life or a candidate for public office
could recover damages resulting from a false statement concerning
him. The less prevalent view required the plaintiff to prove actual
malice on the part of the defendant publisher before the plaintiff
could recover7 West Virginia cases divided on the issue before
eventually adopting the latter view.'
With the New York Times decision,9 the pendulum swung sharp-
ly in favor of the publisher of any matter concerning a public figure
or political candidate. This 1964 decision by the United States
Supreme Court held that the first and fourteenth amendments to
the Constitution of the United States guarantee freedom of speech
and press and will not allow a public figure to recover damages
for a defamatory falsehood relating to his official conduct unless
tions of libel and did not permit it to be construed to include actions for
verbal slander. McClaugherty v. Cooper, 39 W. Va. 313, 314, 19 S.E. 415
(1894). Thus, once truth could be shown in a slander action, the defendant
had an absolute defense, even though he would have been required to prove
good motive and justifiable end if the same defamatory matters had been
involved in a libel suit. It appears that the West Virginia code has attempted
to equate the burden of proof in a libel and in a slander suit, as it provides
that, "[i]n any action for defamation, the defendant may justify by alleging
and proving that the words spoken or writer were true ... " W. VA. CODE,
ch. 57, art. 2, § 4 (Michie 1966).
5 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
6 59 F. 530 (6th Cir. 1893). The court refused to extend the qualified
privilege to a misstatement of fact regarding an officer or candidate for
office, although made in good faith, with proper motives, and with reasonable
grounds for belief in their truth.
7 E.g., Coleman v. MacLennan, 78 Kan. 711, 98 P. 281 (1908). This
view is the one eventually adopted by the United States Supreme Court in
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
8 Two West Virginia cases, decided on the same day, handled the issue
inconsistently. Johnson v. Brown, 13 W. Va. 71 (1878); Sweeney v. Baker,
13 W. Va. 158 (1878). In the Sweeney case, which involved a political
candidate, the court held that a false attack upon the moral character of a
political candidate will be punished. But the Johnson case, which the court
called conditional privilege even though it did not involve the normal cir-
cumstances of conditional privilege, was decided according to the rule that
the plaintiff must prove malice even if the publication was false. Later West
Virginia cases affirmed the latter rule. See Bailey v. the Charleston Mail
Ass'n, 126 W. Va. 292, 27 S.E.2d 837 (1943); Ward v. Ward, 47 W. Va. 766,
35 S.E. 873 (1900).
9New York Times Co v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
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he can prove that the publisher acted with malice."0 The court
quoted with approval the principle of Coleman v. MacLennann,"
which required proof of actual malice to allow a public official to
recover damages for defamation and which had already been adopt-
ed by West Virginia courts. 2
The New York Times rule requires a plaintiff to prove actual
malice on the part of the publisher. The concept of malice is
vital in this discussion because it was the key in the New York
Times decision, and because in the past courts have had difficulty
in deciding what constitutes malice. The New York Times case
defined malice to be the communication of defamatory matters
"with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of
whether or not it was false." 3 Some cases have held that malice
exists where the communication is actuated by "motives of personal
spite, ill will, or where the communication is made with such gross
indifference to the rights of others as will amount to a wilffll or
wanton act."14 But it has been held that it is not necessary in
showing malice to prove hatred or ill will."2
Some of the earlier cases held the language of a defamatory state-
ment may be so outrageous as to raise the presumption of malice. 6
Actions of the defendant publisher may sometimes be used as
evidence by the plaintiff to aid him in proving malice. Such actions
include the publication of other defamatory matters concerning
the same plaintiff or the publisher's refusal to retract defamatory
statements once they have been proven false.'"
The New York Times rule indicated that one form of malice was
"reckless disregard" for whether a defamatory statement was true
or false. 8 This theory of malice was construed in Mahnke v. North-
10 d.
11 78 Kan. 711, 98 P. 281 (1908).
12 Supra note 8.
13 New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 280 (1964); accord,
Hurley v. Northwest Publications, Inc., 273 F. Supp. 967 (1967); Grabavoy
v. Wilson, 87 Ill. App. 2d 193, 230 N.E.2d 581 (1967); Mahnke v. Northwest
Publications, Inc., 160 N.W.2d 1 (Minn. 1968).14 E.g., Chalkley v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 150 Va. 301, 303, 143 S.E.
631, 632 (1928).
-5 England v. Daily Gazette Co., 143 W. Va. 700, 714, 104 S.E.2d
306, 314 (1958).
16 Rgney v. Keesee & Co., 104 W. Va. 168, 172, 139 S.E. 650, 652
(1927); accord, City of Mullens v. Davidson, 133 W. Va. 557, 57 S.E.2d 1
(1949).
17 England v. Daily Gazette Co., 143 W. Va. 700, 104 S.E.2d 306 (1958);
see, 33 AM. JUR., Libel & Slander, §§ 267, 269 (1941).
8 New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
1969]
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west Publications, Inc. 9 to the heedless conduct, which is far more
than merely negligent and shows a wanton indifference to con-
sequences. Garrison v. Louisiana held that unreasonableness or
mere negligence is not sufficient to show reckless disregard, as the
Court stated that "only false statements made with the high
degree of awareness of their probable falsity demanded by New
York Times may be the subject of... sanctions."2 Thus, decisions
since New York Times have set up a formidable definition of malice
which the plaintiff must prove in order to recover. The court at-
tempted to limit the effect of the New York Times decision to de-
famatory falsehoods relating to a public figure's "official conduct."2 '
This phrase appeared possibly to be an attempt to restrict comment
on a public figure's private life, but subsequent cases have extended
the scope of the New York Times rule. Garrison v. Louisiana2 2
has rendered the "official conduct" limitation of the privilege virtual-
ly useless. In this case, the Court held that the privilege includes
anything which might touch on an official's fitness for office and
the New York Times doctrine would not be inapplicable because
an official's private reputation, as well as his public reputation, is
harmed.2 3
The great weight of authority indicates that merely becoming
a political candidate thrusts upon one the mantle of a public of-
ficial.24 New York Times v. Sullivan held that the rule requiring
a plaintiff claiming defamation to prove actual malice should extend
to "a great variety of subjects, including matters of public concern,
public men and candidates for office."25 Cases decided after the
New York Times decision have held that the New York Times
rule should be applied to candidates for public office,26 to partici-
19 160 N.W.2d 1, 15 (Minn. 1968).
20 379 U.S. 64, 74 (1964).
21 New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
22 379 U.S. 64 (1964).
23 1d. at 77.
2 4 Eg., Goldwater v. Ginzburg, 261 F. Supp. 784, (D.C. N.Y. 1966); Peck
v. Coos Bay Times Publishing Co, 122 Ore 408, 259 P 312 (1927).
25 New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 281 (1964); accord,
Coleman v. MacLennan, 78 Kan. 723, 98 P. 285 (1908).
26Goldwater v. Ginzburg, 261 F. Supp. 784 (D.C.N.Y. 1966); Dyer v.
Davis, 189 So. 2d 678 (La. App. 1966), cert. denied, 250 La. 533, 197 So.
2d 79 (1967). Goldwater v. Ginzburg, Supra held that Barry Goldwater, a
candidate for the Presidency of the United States, opened to public discussion
any and all elements of his character and background which might have any
bearing on his fitness for office. Dyer v. Davis, Supra held that the New
York Times rule applies to the private character, reputation, professional skill
and integrity of a candidate for public office. Contra, Clark v. Pearson,
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pants in debates on issues of great public concern,27 and to persons
who have projected themselves into public controversy.2"
At first glance, it appears that an incumbent candidate might be
subjected to less limited attacks than his opponent, in that the law
allows criticism of public officials to be privileged. The argument
could be made that an incumbent who already holds an elective
office is more of a public official than a candidate who is not an
incumbent. However, cases cited earlier indicate that merely be-
coming a candidate for office subjects one to the same standard as
a public official. Then, too, it has been held that differentiation
between the freedom of speech allowed to an incumbent candidate
and that permitted his opponent would violate the equal protection
clause of the fourteenth amendment.29
There might well be a valid question of whether a candidate
for an appointive office should be considered to be a public official.
The Sweeney case raised the issue saying that if the candidate is
seeking an appointive office, "the right to make unjust and false
commentaries on his qualifications is much more limited."3 In
most instances, however, the same standards have been applied to
appointive officials.3'
Proponents of the New York Times rule argue in its justification
that denial of the privilege would shield dishonest officials from
criticism and thereby lower the standard of official conduct. Pro-
ponents further argue that free speech in commenting on public
officials and candidates is vital to allow the voting public to better
evaluate the qualifications and performance of its leaders. These
same advocates maintain that requiring the publisher to prove the
truth of his publications regarding a public official's character and
248 F. Supp. 188 (D.D.C. 1965); Fignole v. Curtis Publishing Co., 247 F.
Supp. 595 (S.D.N.Y. 1965). These two federal district court cases held that
the New York Times rule applies to public figures in general, but not to
political candidates as such. However, most cases and writers agree that it is
difficult to imagine such a limitation being adopted by the United States
Supreme Court. See, Hanson, Developments in the Law of Libel: Impact of
the New York Times Rule, 7 Wm. & MARY L. REv. 222 (1966).27 Pauling v. News Syndicate Co., 335 F.2d 659 (2nd Cir. 1964), cert.
denied, 379 U.S. 968.28 Buckley v. New York Post Corp., 373 F.2d 175 (2nd Cir. 1967).29 Noonan v. Rousselot, 239 Cal. App. 2d 447, 48 Cal. Rptr. 817 (1966);
Dyer v. Davis, 189 So. 2d 678 (La. App. 1966), cert. denied, 250 La. 533, 197
So. 2d 79.3 0 Sweeney v. Baker, 13 W. Va. 158, 195 (1878).
3, Time Inc. v. Pape, 354 F.2d 599 (7th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384
U.S. 909 (1966); See, 28 Omo ST. L.J. 502 (1967).
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conduct would amount to virtual self-censorship, which would inhibit
the ability of the public to select honest and competent officials.
These arguments are sound; however, agreement with the justi-
fications of the New York Times decision does not necessarily
demand argreement with the stringent provisions of the rule itself.
The rule, while freeing publishers from the yoke of proving truth
of his publications, has cast the even more burdensome task of
proving malice upon the defamed plaintiff, even if the plaintiff can
conclusively prove the falsity of the statements. The difficulty
which courts have had in determining what constitutes malice has
already been noted.32 Cases decided after New York Times have
set up so stringent a test for malice that it is nearly impossible for
a plaintiff to recover in such a case. 3
The recent case of Mahnke v. Northwest Publications, Inc. 4
shows just how far the public's right to information has been em-
phasized. A police official was reported by a newspaper to have re-
fused to arrest (or to allow detectives working under him to arrest)
a father who had been charged with sexually molesting his child, to
have "flown into a rage" when a detective requested permission to
arrest the accused molester, and to have accused the mother of
the child of "just trying to get even with the father."3 The de-
fendant newspaper had made no attempt to verify the facts of the
story with the police official himself before publishing the story,
even though he was available for comment. 6 The police official
sued for defamation and proved that all of the assertions in the
newspaper article were entirely false. The court denied recovery,
stating that a public official must show actual malice in a publication
involving his conduct. 7
As the law now stands, a public official or candidate for office
cannot recover for even a proven falsehood unless he can prove
actual malice. It may be reasonably argued, however that the
burden of proving malice should not be thrown on the plaintiff if
he can establish the falsity of a defamatory publication. Once the
plaintiff has proven the falsity of a defamatory communication, the
32 See text at note 12 supra.
33 Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64 (1964); Mahnke V. Northwest
Publications, Inc., 160 N.W.2d 1 (Minn. 1968).
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